# Run it behind a Cloudflare Portal

Put the server behind a Cloudflare MCP Server Portal and require it with Gateway policy, with the server properties that help and the open questions.

For administrators running Cloudflare Zero Trust who want one managed endpoint in front of MCP servers.

> [!CAREFUL] Not tested end to end
> This page describes Cloudflare's published controls and properties of this server. It has not been run against a live Portal. In particular, confirm how your Portal forwards the `Authorization` header before relying on it.

## Cloudflare controls

| Control | Gives you | Configured in |
|---|---|---|
| MCP Server Portal | One endpoint in front of upstream servers, with Access identity, a curated tool catalogue and logs | Zero Trust dashboard |
| Gateway MCP detection | Flags inspected requests carrying `MCP-Protocol-Version`, so a policy can allow or block MCP | Gateway, with TLS inspection |
| Portal-only enforcement | Tells Portal traffic from direct connections | Gateway network and HTTP policies |
| Logpush | Exports Portal tool activity | Zero Trust logs |

Cloudflare's published example for blocking direct MCP traffic, with action Block:

```text
experimental.is_mcp == true and not traffic.onramp in ("mcp_portal")
```

## What the server already does

| Property | Detail |
|---|---|
| Read-only tools | Every VDB tool and `vdb_request` declares `readOnlyHint: true`. Only `vulnetix_auth_start` and `vulnetix_auth_poll` are not read-only, and both are `destructiveHint: false`. |
| Routing headers | `Mcp-Method` and `Mcp-Name` are on every request and must match the body, so a WAF can act on `tools/call` for a given tool without parsing JSON |
| Stable catalogue | `tools/list` is the same for every caller and cached 300 seconds |
| Public discovery | `GET /mcp/server-card` returns the endpoint and required header without a connection |
| No stored state | Nothing per user to keep in step |

## Curating the catalogue

| Goal | Expose |
|---|---|
| Data only, no AI | Everything; the five AI tools still return VDB data, and callers can pass `ai: false` |
| No sign-in from chat | Everything except `vulnetix_auth_start` and `vulnetix_auth_poll` |

## Open questions

| Question | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| How does the Portal pass `Authorization`? | The server accepts only a per-user credential in that header and never supplies one |
| Will the Portal inject one shared credential? | vdb-api meters quota per organisation. One shared credential puts every user in one bucket. |
| Can your clients be TLS-inspected? | Gateway MCP detection depends on it; clients that pin certificates are not inspected |
