# VNX-1290: Security identifier decoded from client data without verification

Detects Python code that derives an identity by merely base64- or hex-decoding a cookie or an identity-bearing header, with no signature check.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-1290` |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | `warning` |
| Kind | `sast` |
| Languages | Python |
| CWE | [CWE-1290](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1290.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-66](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C` |
| Tags | `incorrect-decoding` `security-identifier` `cwe-1290` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-1290.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-1290.rego) |

## Overview

VNX-1290 maps to [CWE-1290: Incorrect Decoding of Security Identifiers](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1290.html). CWE-1290 is a hardware weakness: a bus decoder that maps an agent's security identifier to the wrong agent. It has no direct source-code form, so the rule reports its nearest software analogue: decoding a security identifier from a value the client holds and trusting the result. Base64 and hex are encodings, not protection: any client can encode `admin:` or a pickled admin object.

Reported: `b64decode`, `urlsafe_b64decode`, `standard_b64decode`, `b32decode`, `b16decode`, `decodebytes`, `binascii.a2b_base64` and `bytes.fromhex` applied to a cookie (Flask `request.cookies`, Django `request.COOKIES`, Bottle/Tornado `get_cookie`) or to a custom header whose name says it carries identity (token, session, auth, identity, user, jwt, sid), directly or through a variable assigned from one in the 10 lines above.

Not reported: a decode with an HMAC or signature check, `compare_digest`, itsdangerous, `django.core.signing` or a `.verify()` call within 10 lines before or 3 after; the `Authorization` header (Basic credentials are checked against a store afterwards); form fields and other data that is not an identifier; constants, comments and strings. Unverified JWT decoding is [VNX-JWT-004](/sast/rules/vnx-jwt-004.md).

## What gets flagged

```python
session_token = request.cookies.get("session")
username = base64.b64decode(session_token).decode().split(":")[0]   # FLAGGED
```

```python
claims = json.loads(urlsafe_b64decode(request.headers["X-Auth-Token"]))   # FLAGGED
```

## What is not flagged

```python
payload, _, sig = request.cookies.get("session", "").partition(".")
expected = hmac.new(SECRET, payload.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, sig):
    abort(403)
return base64.b64decode(payload).decode()
```

## Remediation

1. Use the framework's signed session (Flask `session`, Django sessions) or a signing library (itsdangerous, `django.core.signing`).
2. If a token must be hand-built, sign it with an HMAC and verify the signature with `hmac.compare_digest` before decoding.
3. Never deserialise (pickle) a client-held value.

## References

- [CWE-1290: Incorrect Decoding of Security Identifiers](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1290.html)
- [CWE-565: Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-1290
// nosec vnx-1290
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-1290 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
