VNX-341: Predictable from Observable State
Detects secrets built from state an attacker can observe or estimate (the clock, the process id, the client address or the host name), raw or hashed.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-341 |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | warning |
| Kind | sast |
| Languages | C, C++, Python, JavaScript / TypeScript, PHP, Java, Kotlin, Go, Ruby |
| CWE | CWE-341 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-66 |
| ATT&CK | T1190 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C |
| Tags | randomness predictable cwe-341 |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-341.rego |
Overview
VNX-341 maps to CWE-341: Predictable from Observable State. A token made from the time of the request, the PID of the server or the client’s IP address has only a handful of plausible values, and hashing it does not add any: an attacker computes the same hash for each candidate.
The rule reports the clock (time(), microtime(), date(), time.time(), datetime.now(), Date.now(), new Date(), getTime(), System.currentTimeMillis()/nanoTime(), Instant.now(), time.Now(), Time.now, clock(), tv_sec/tv_usec, hrtime, performance.now()), the process id (getpid(), os.getpid(), os.Getpid(), getmypid(), Process.pid, process.pid) and the client address or host name (REMOTE_ADDR, getRemoteAddr(), request.remote_addr, req.ip, remote_ip, RemoteAddr, gethostname(), uuid.getnode()) when the value is stored under, keyed by or returned as a secret (token, password, secret, nonce, salt, OTP, CSRF, session id, session cookie value, API key, reset/confirmation code), set as the value of a session or auth cookie, written with snprintf/strcpy into a buffer named for a secret, or assigned to a variable that reaches one of those within six lines.
What gets flagged
// FLAGGED: the session cookie is the clock
$cookie_value = time();
setcookie("dvwaSession", $cookie_value);
// FLAGGED: hashing the client address and the time adds nothing
$session_id = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] . microtime());
# FLAGGED
token = hashlib.md5(str(time.time()).encode()).hexdigest()
session_id = f"{request.remote_addr}-{int(time.time())}"
// FLAGGED
const sessionId = Date.now().toString(36);
What is not flagged
- Timestamps stored as bookkeeping (
iat,exp,expires,created,last_activity,login_time,token_expiry,ttl), cookie expiry arguments, and a timestamp used only with a lifetime added ($now + TOKEN_LIFE). - The error or status result of a call that takes the clock (
err = signer.SignHTTP(..., time.Now())), and comparisons. - A line that also draws from a CSPRNG (
random_bytes,secrets,os.urandom,crypto.randomBytes,SecureRandom,crypto/rand,RAND_bytes,getrandom,uuid4). - PRNG seeding (VNX-337), identifier generators such as
uniqid()and time-based UUIDs (VNX-340), test files, and the pattern in comments or string literals.
Remediation
- Generate secrets with a CSPRNG and nothing else:
secrets.token_urlsafe(),crypto.randomBytes(),random_bytes(),SecureRandom,crypto/rand,RAND_bytes(). - Keep timestamps for expiry checks, not for the secret itself.
- For confirmed false positives, add a
# vulnetix-ignore: VNX-341comment on the line.
References
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-341
// nosec vnx-341
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-341 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.