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VNX-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

A signature or MAC check whose result is discarded, or whose failure is caught and swallowed, so forged data is processed as genuine. Java, Go.

Updated 05 Nov 2026Markdown
Field Value
Rule ID VNX-347
Severity High
SARIF level error
Kind sast
Languages Go, Java, JavaScript / TypeScript, Python
CWE CWE-347
CAPEC CAPEC-66
ATT&CK T1190
CWSS vector CWSS:1.0/TI:H/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:H/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:H
Tags signature crypto cwe-347
Source internal/sast/rules/vnx-347.rego

Overview

VNX-347 maps to CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature. It reports code that runs a signature or MAC check and then ignores the outcome:

  • Result discarded (the call is a bare statement): Java java.security.Signature.verify(); Go ed25519.Verify, ecdsa.Verify/VerifyASN1, hmac.Equal, subtle.ConstantTimeCompare, rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15/VerifyPSS (also assigned to _); Node.js verify() on a createVerify() object, crypto.verify() without a callback, crypto.timingSafeEqual(), crypto.subtle.verify(), the jws package’s boolean jws.verify(); Python hmac.compare_digest().
  • Failure swallowed: Python except InvalidSignature/BadSignature/BadSignatureError/InvalidSignatureError (or a bare/Exception handler around a .verify() statement) whose body is only pass, ... or a log call; Java catch (SignatureException | SignatureVerificationException | InvalidSignatureException | JWTVerificationException | JwtException ...) (or Exception around a .verify() statement) whose block is empty or only logs.

Why this matters

A verification that nobody checks is no verification: a forged update, webhook, licence or token is accepted exactly as a genuine one. The bug survives review because the verify call is visibly there.

Not reported: a Python handler whose try body only assigns the verified value to names set to None/False/empty just above it (user_id = None; try: user_id = s.loads(v) except BadSignature: pass fails closed; a default holding the unverified input is still reported); results that are tested, assigned, returned or passed on (including an assignment split over two lines); calls that throw on failure (jsonwebtoken jwt.verify, auth0 JWTVerifier.verify) outside a swallowing handler; crypto.verify with a callback; handlers that raise, return or rethrow; empty catches around code that verifies nothing; comments and string literals. Disabled TLS certificate validation is VNX-CRYPTO-005’s concern and disabled JWT verification VNX-JWT-001’s.

What gets flagged

sig.update(payload);
sig.verify(sigBytes);
return payload;
ed25519.Verify(pub, body, sig)
_ = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, crypto.SHA256, digest, sig)
verifier.verify(publicKey, signature, "base64");
crypto.timingSafeEqual(digest, Buffer.from(req.get("X-Signature"), "hex"));
try:
    public_key.verify(signature, blob)
except InvalidSignature:
    pass

Remediation

  1. Test the result and stop on failure: if (!sig.verify(s)) throw ..., if !ed25519.Verify(...) { return err }, if not hmac.compare_digest(...): abort(401).
  2. In a handler for a signature failure, reject the input: raise, return an error, or abort the request.

References

Suppressing this rule

Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):

# nosec vnx-347
// nosec vnx-347

Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-347 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.

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