# VNX-362: Check-then-use race on a file path (TOCTOU)

A file path is checked and then used by name a few lines later, so another process can replace the file (typically with a symlink) between the check and the use

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-362` |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | `warning` |
| Kind | `sast` |
| Languages | Go, Python |
| CWE | [CWE-362](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-66](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C` |
| Tags | `race-condition` `toctou` `cwe-362` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-362.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-362.rego) |

## Overview

VNX-362 maps to [CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html). A file path is checked and then used by name a few lines later, so another process can replace the file (typically with a symlink) between the check and the use. Reported in Python: os.path.exists/isfile/lexists(p) or a pathlib p.exists()/p.is_file() followed within eight lines by a write or permission change on the same path (open(p, 'w'/'a'/'r+'), os.open(p, ...O_CREAT/O_WRONLY/O_RDWR...) without O_EXCL, os.chmod/os.chown, p.write_text/p.write_bytes/p.open('w')), and os.access(p, ...) followed by any open of p (the access check is the classic setuid TOCTOU). Reported in Go: os.Stat/os.Lstat(p) followed by os.Create, os.WriteFile/ioutil.WriteFile, os.Chmod/os.Chown/os.Truncate or os.OpenFile with a write or create flag and no O_EXCL on the same path, and syscall/unix.Access(p) followed by any open of p. Not reported: exclusive creation (mode 'x', O_EXCL), os.makedirs/os.MkdirAll, a plain read after an existence check, a check and a use on different paths, a Go Lstat that tests ModeSymlink (VNX-363 covers that), comments, strings and test files.

## Why this matters

Checking a path and then using it by name are two separate lookups. Between them another process can replace the file, usually with a symbolic link to a file the program can write but the attacker cannot, and the write lands there.

## What gets flagged

```python
# FLAGGED: existence check, then a write to the same path
if not os.path.exists(path):
    with open(path, "w") as fh:
        fh.write(data)
```

```go
// FLAGGED: Stat, then Create on the same path
if _, err := os.Stat(path); os.IsNotExist(err) {
	f, err := os.Create(path)
```

## What is not flagged

```python
# exclusive creation fails if the file appeared in the meantime
with open(path, "x") as fh:
    fh.write(data)
```

```go
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
```

A plain read after an existence check, `os.makedirs`/`os.MkdirAll`, a check and a use on different paths or in different functions, comments and test files are not reported. A call wrapped over lines is read as one statement, so `O_EXCL` on a continuation line still counts as exclusive creation.

## Remediation

1. Drop the check and let the operation fail atomically: open with `'x'` / `O_EXCL` to create, and handle `FileExistsError` / `os.ErrExist`.
2. Open once and operate on the descriptor (`os.fchmod`, `f.Chmod`) instead of the path.
3. Never use `access()` to decide whether a privileged process may open a file.

## References

- [CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-362
// nosec vnx-362
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-362 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
