# VNX-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

A file is checked by name and then opened or changed by the same name within ten lines, in C or C++.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-367` |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | `warning` |
| Kind | `sast` |
| Languages | C, C++ |
| CWE | [CWE-367](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-66](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C` |
| Tags | `toctou` `race-condition` `cwe-367` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-367.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-367.rego) |

## Overview

VNX-367 maps to [CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html). A file is checked by name and then opened or changed by the same name within ten lines, in C or C++, so another process can swap the file (typically for a symlink) between the check and the use. Reported: access(), eaccess() or euidaccess() on a path followed by any open, open64, fopen, freopen, creat, chmod, chown, lchown, truncate or exec* of that path (the access-then-open setuid race); and stat(), lstat(), stat64() or lstat64() on a path followed by a write or permission change on it: open with O_WRONLY/O_RDWR/O_CREAT/O_TRUNC/O_APPEND, fopen with a w/a/+ mode, creat, chmod, chown, lchown or truncate. The same check and use on one line count. The path may be a variable, a member, a std::string's c_str() or a literal. Not reported: open with O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW, a read after a stat, fstat/fchmod on a descriptor (the safe form), a check and a use on different paths, comments and string literals.

## Why this matters

`access()` and `stat()` look a path up; the `open()` that follows looks it up again. Between the two another process can replace the file with a symbolic link, so a setuid program that checked the real user's permission writes to a file the user could not.

## What gets flagged

```c
/* FLAGGED: access() check, then open of the same path */
if (access(path, W_OK) != 0)
	return -1;
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND);
```

```c
/* FLAGGED: stat(), then a write-mode fopen */
if (stat(cfg, &st) == 0 && st.st_uid == getuid())
	fp = fopen(cfg, "w");
```

## What is not flagged

```c
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
fstat(fd, &st);   /* check the descriptor you opened */
```

A read after a `stat()` (the write flags are read from that call's own text, so a later `open(dst, O_CREAT ...)` does not count), `fstat`/`fchmod` on a descriptor, a check and a use on different paths or in different functions, comments and string literals are not reported.

## Remediation

1. Open first, then check the descriptor with `fstat`, and change it with `fchmod`/`fchown`.
2. Use `O_EXCL` and `O_NOFOLLOW`; in a setuid program drop to the real user's IDs before opening instead of calling `access()`.

## References

- [CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-367
// nosec vnx-367
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-367 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
