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VNX-635: Unresolved security TODO/FIXME in production code

Detects TODO, FIXME, XXX and HACK comments whose text admits an unresolved security gap (missing authentication, CSRF protection, validation or escaping.

Updated 05 Nov 2026Markdown
Field Value
Rule ID VNX-635
Severity Medium
SARIF level warning
Kind sast
Languages Go, Java, Kotlin, JavaScript / TypeScript, PHP, Python, Ruby
CWE CWE-635
CAPEC CAPEC-97
ATT&CK T1557
CWSS vector CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C
Tags security-todo comments cwe-635
Source internal/sast/rules/vnx-635.rego

Overview

CWE-635 is a view (the weaknesses NVD used from 2008 to 2016), not a weakness with a code shape of its own. This rule reports the most concrete code-level signal that maps onto it: a work marker in which the author admits that a security control is missing, disabled or broken. Such a comment is a deferred decision that is easy to ship and easy for anyone reading the source to exploit.

A finding needs a TODO, FIXME, XXX or HACK marker (upper case) inside a comment (//, #, /* or a block-comment line), followed on the same line by an admission:

  • the code is called insecure or vulnerable, a security hole/issue/risk/bug/flaw/fix is named, or an injection (SQL, command, template…), XSS, SSRF, open redirect or path traversal risk is named;
  • verify the signature, certificate, HMAC or JWT;
  • add, implement, missing, need, enable or no followed by authentication, authorization, CSRF/XSRF, access control, permission checks, (input) validation, sanitising, escaping, encryption, rate limiting, or signature/certificate verification;
  • input not validated / sanitised / escaped / authenticated / authorised / encrypted / verified (or unvalidated, unsanitized, …);
  • validate / sanitise / escape user input, escape output, remove this bypass;
  • a hard-coded (API) password, secret, key, credential or token;
  • disable, skip or bypass SSL/TLS, certificates, CSRF, auth, signatures or verification, in either order (hostname verification disabled).

What gets flagged

// TODO: add authentication before exposing this handler     // FLAGGED
id := r.URL.Query().Get("id") // FIXME: id is not validated  // FLAGGED
# FIXME: path is unsanitized, sanitize before shelling out   # FLAGGED
# TODO disable ssl verification only for staging             # FLAGGED
// HACK: skipping signature verification, vulnerable to token forgery  // FLAGGED
// FIXME: remove this bypass before going to prod                      // FLAGGED

What is not flagged

  • Ordinary work markers: TODO: refactor, FIXME: handle overflow, TODO add tests, TODO: validate the config schema.
  • Comments that describe a control as present (“authentication is added by the router middleware”).
  • The words inside string literals, test code and documentation files.

Remediation

Resolve the gap before release. If it has to wait, track it as a security issue with an owner and a priority, and remove the comment’s claim from the code path that ships.

References

Suppressing this rule

Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):

# nosec vnx-635
// nosec vnx-635

Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-635 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.

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