# VNX-931: Authorization rule opens every request, an admin path or a state-changing endpoint to anyone

CWE-931 is an OWASP Top Ten 2013 category with no code shape of its own.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-931` |
| Severity | Low |
| SARIF level | `note` |
| Kind | `sast` |
| Languages | Java, Kotlin |
| CWE | [CWE-931](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/931.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-66](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:L/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:L/DI:H/EX:L/EC:N/P:L` |
| Tags | `missing-auth-cc` `spring-security` `cwe-931` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-931.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-931.rego) |

## Overview

CWE-931 is an OWASP Top Ten 2013 category with no code shape of its own; this rule reports the concrete missing-authorization configuration it was generated for, in Java and Kotlin: Spring Security anyRequest().permitAll() (also split across lines, and the Kotlin DSL authorize(anyRequest, permitAll)); a matcher (requestMatchers, antMatchers, mvcMatchers, regexMatchers, pathMatchers or the Kotlin authorize) for "/**", an /admin, /management or /internal path, the whole /actuator tree or EndpointRequest.toAnyEndpoint() followed by permitAll(); and a JAX-RS/Jakarta @PermitAll on a method annotated @DELETE, @PUT or @PATCH. Not reported: permitAll on public paths (login, static assets, /actuator/health), formLogin()/logout() permitAll, @PermitAll on GET or POST methods (login and registration are public by design), StrictMode policies, comments and strings.

## Why this matters

permitAll() on every request, on the administrative tree or on the actuator endpoints turns off authentication for exactly the routes that most need it. A JAX-RS @PermitAll on a DELETE, PUT or PATCH method lets anyone change data.

## What gets flagged

```
http.authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
        .anyRequest().permitAll());
auth.requestMatchers("/admin/**").permitAll();
auth.requestMatchers(EndpointRequest.toAnyEndpoint()).permitAll();
authorize(anyRequest, permitAll)

@DELETE
@PermitAll
public void deleteUser(@PathParam("id") long id) { ... }
```

## What is not flagged

```
auth.requestMatchers("/login", "/css/**", "/actuator/health").permitAll()
    .requestMatchers("/admin/**").hasRole("ADMIN")
    .anyRequest().authenticated();
http.formLogin(form -> form.loginPage("/login").permitAll());
```

## Remediation

1. End the chain with `.anyRequest().authenticated()` (or `denyAll()`).
2. Restrict administrative and actuator paths with `hasRole(...)`; expose only `/actuator/health` publicly.
3. Use `@RolesAllowed` on state-changing JAX-RS methods.
4. For a confirmed false positive, add a `vulnetix-ignore: VNX-931` comment on the line.

## References

- [CWE-931](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/931.html)
- [Spring Security: Authorize HTTP Requests](https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/reference/servlet/authorization/authorize-http-requests.html)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-931
// nosec vnx-931
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-931 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
