# VNX-938: Unvalidated redirect or forward to a request-supplied destination

Reports Python redirects whose destination is request data, and Java/Kotlin server-side forwards (getRequestDispatcher.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-938` |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | `warning` |
| Kind | `sast` |
| Languages | Python, Java, Kotlin |
| CWE | [CWE-938](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/938.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-66](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C` |
| Tags | `open-redirect` `forward` `cwe-938` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-938.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-938.rego) |

## Overview

VNX-938 maps to [CWE-938: OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/938.html). A redirect to a user-supplied URL sends victims from a trusted domain to a phishing page; a forward to a user-supplied path runs inside the application and can serve pages the user's role should not reach. This rule covers the shapes the per-language open-redirect rules do not: Python redirects, Java/Kotlin forwards, and Kotlin redirects (VNX-JAVA-007 covers Java redirects, and the Node.js, PHP and Go open-redirect rules cover those languages).

## What gets flagged

```python
return redirect(request.args.get("next", "/"))            # flagged (Flask)

next_url = request.GET.get("next")
return HttpResponseRedirect(next_url)                      # flagged (Django)
```

```java
String page = request.getParameter("page");
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/views/" + page + ".jsp").forward(request, response);   // flagged

public String next(@RequestParam("step") String step) {
    return "forward:" + step;                              // flagged
}
```

```kotlin
fun jump(@RequestParam target: String): String = "forward:$target"   // flagged
response.sendRedirect(request.getParameter("url"))                    // flagged
```

Not flagged: a destination that starts with a fixed literal (`redirect(f"/blog/{id}")`), `url_for`/`reverse` lookups and named URL patterns, a value looked up in a constant map, a value checked first (`url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme`, `urlparse(...).netloc`, an allowlist membership test, `containsKey`/`startsWith`/`equals`), request attributes and other server-side values, comments and string literals. A fixed prefix on a forward path does not prevent `../` traversal, so it is still reported.

## Remediation

Map the request value to a fixed set of destinations, or validate it against an allowlist:

```python
from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme

if not url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(next_url, allowed_hosts={request.get_host()}):
    next_url = "/"
return HttpResponseRedirect(next_url)
```

## References

- [CWE-938: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/938.html)
- [OWASP Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-938
// nosec vnx-938
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-938 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
