# VNX-SEC-057: Grafana API / service account token

Reports a hard-coded Grafana service account token (glsa_), Grafana Cloud access policy token (glc_eyJ...) or legacy Grafana API key (eyJrIjoi...).

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-SEC-057` |
| Severity | Critical |
| SARIF level | `error` |
| Kind | `secrets` |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | [CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-191](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/191.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1552.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W` |
| Tags | `secrets` `grafana` `monitoring` `credentials` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-057.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-057.rego) |

## Overview

This rule reports a Grafana credential written into a file: a service account token (`glsa_` + 32 alphanumerics + `_` + 8 hex), a Grafana Cloud access policy token (`glc_` followed by its base64 JSON body, `glc_eyJ...`), or a legacy Grafana API key (the base64 of `{"k":"`, `eyJrIjoi...`, 70+ characters). Each token must stand alone rather than sit inside a longer identifier, and must have enough entropy to be real. The snippet is redacted.

It does not report bare prefixes in a prefix check, placeholder bodies (`xxxx`, `0000`, `YOUR_TOKEN`), ordinary JWTs (`eyJhbGci...`), tokens read from the environment, or test, fixture and vendored paths.

## What gets flagged

```go
// FLAGGED: service account token in a client config
return gapi.New("https://grafana.acme.internal", gapi.Config{
	APIKey: "glsa_<32 alphanumerics>_<8 hex>",
})
```

```hcl
# FLAGGED: Grafana Cloud access policy token in Terraform
cloud_access_policy_token = "glc_eyJ<base64 body>=="
```

```python
# NOT FLAGGED: read from the environment
token = os.environ["GRAFANA_SA_TOKEN"]
```

## Why this matters

Hardcoded grafana api / service account token values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

## Remediation

1. **Revoke the leaked credential** in the provider's console immediately.
2. **Replace with a short-lived alternative**, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
3. **Store the new credential in a secrets manager** (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
4. **Audit the provider's access logs** for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
5. **Purge from git history** with `git filter-repo` or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
6. **Enable push protection** so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

## References

- [CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
- [gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks)
- [truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog)
- [OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credentials_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/)
- [git-filter-repo](https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-sec-057
// nosec vnx-sec-057
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-057 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
