# VNX-SEC-064: Redis connection string with credentials

Reports a Redis connection URL (redis://, rediss://, including the empty-user redis://:password@host form) that embeds a literal password.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-SEC-064` |
| Severity | Critical |
| SARIF level | `error` |
| Kind | `secrets` |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | [CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-191](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/191.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1552.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W` |
| Tags | `secrets` `redis` `database` `credentials` `connection-string` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-064.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-064.rego) |

## Overview

This rule reports a Redis connection URL that embeds a literal password: `redis://` or `rediss://user:password@host`, including the empty-user form `redis://:password@host` used by AUTH-only servers, in code, config, `.env` and compose files. The password is masked in the snippet.

It does not report a password that is interpolated or templated (`${VAR}`, `$VAR`, `{{ }}`, `%s`, `<password>`, f-string or template-literal fields, concatenation), a default or placeholder word (`password`, `redis`, `default`, `changeme`, the user name itself), a server on localhost or a documentation host (`example.com`, `*.test`, a bare `host` or `hostname`), 127.0.0.1 or ::1, URLs without a password, Markdown/reStructuredText/AsciiDoc and `*.example`/`*.sample`/`*.template` files, or test, fixture, vendored and generated files. VNX-SEC-008 and VNX-SEC-577 report the same URLs.

## What gets flagged

```python
# FLAGGED: redis-py URL with a literal password
r = redis.from_url("redis://worker:<password>@10.0.5.9:6379/2")
```

```yaml
# FLAGGED: TLS URL with an AUTH-only password (empty user)
production:
  url: rediss://:<password>@cache.acme.internal:6380/0
```

```python
# NOT FLAGGED: interpolated password
REDIS_URL = f"redis://:{REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379/0"
```

## Why this matters

Hardcoded redis connection string with credentials values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

## Remediation

1. **Revoke the leaked credential** in the provider's console immediately.
2. **Replace with a short-lived alternative**, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
3. **Store the new credential in a secrets manager** (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
4. **Audit the provider's access logs** for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
5. **Purge from git history** with `git filter-repo` or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
6. **Enable push protection** so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

## References

- [CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
- [gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks)
- [truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog)
- [OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credentials_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/)
- [git-filter-repo](https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-sec-064
// nosec vnx-sec-064
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-064 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
