# VNX-SEC-066: HTTP bearer authentication header

Detects literal HTTP Bearer tokens: a "Bearer <token>" value of 20+ high-entropy characters written into code, scripts or request files.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-SEC-066` |
| Severity | High |
| SARIF level | `error` |
| Kind | `secrets` |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | [CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-191](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/191.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1552.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:H/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:H/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:H` |
| Tags | `secrets` `http` `bearer` `credentials` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-066.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-066.rego) |

## Overview

This rule reports the string `Bearer <token>` (an `Authorization` header in a `.http` file or YAML, a `curl -H` argument, a headers dict or object, a `Header.Set` call, a template literal, a constant, or the two-argument .NET `new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", "...")`) when the token is at least 20 characters, contains a digit or is a JWT, and has high entropy. The token is masked in the snippet.

It does not report headers built from variables (`"Bearer " + token`, `${TOKEN}`, `$(gcloud auth print-access-token)`, `{{ .Values.token }}`), low-entropy or placeholder values (`invalid_token_format`, `YOUR_ACCESS_TOKEN`, the jwt.io sample token), comment lines, Markdown/reStructuredText/AsciiDoc, and test, fixture, vendored and generated files.

## What gets flagged

```sh
curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer <40 random characters>' https://ci.acme-corp.io/api/v4/trigger
```

```python
session.headers.update({"Authorization": "Bearer <32 random characters>"})
```

Not flagged:

```sh
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITLAB_TOKEN}" https://gitlab.acme-corp.io/api/v4/projects
```

## Why this matters

Hardcoded http bearer authentication header values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

## Remediation

1. **Revoke the leaked credential** in the provider's console immediately.
2. **Replace with a short-lived alternative**, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
3. **Store the new credential in a secrets manager** (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
4. **Audit the provider's access logs** for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
5. **Purge from git history** with `git filter-repo` or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
6. **Enable push protection** so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

## References

- [CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
- [gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks)
- [truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog)
- [OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credentials_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/)
- [git-filter-repo](https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-sec-066
// nosec vnx-sec-066
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-066 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
