# VNX-SEC-074: Kubernetes Secret manifest with credential data

Reports each credential entry with a literal value in the data: or stringData.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | `VNX-SEC-074` |
| Severity | High |
| SARIF level | `error` |
| Kind | `secrets` |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | [CWE-798](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html) |
| CAPEC | [CAPEC-191](https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/191.html) |
| ATT&CK | [T1552.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) |
| CWSS vector | `CWSS:1.0/TI:H/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:H/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:H` |
| Tags | `secrets` `kubernetes` `credentials` |
| Source | [`internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-074.rego`](https://github.com/Vulnesis/cli/blob/main/internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-074.rego) |

## Overview

This rule reads every YAML document whose top-level `kind` is `Secret` (multi-document files included) and reports each entry in its `data:` or `stringData:` block whose key names a credential (password, token, secret, key, auth, credentials, connection string, `.dockerconfigjson`) and whose value is a literal. Base64 in `data:` is an encoding, not encryption.

## Why this matters

Hardcoded kubernetes secret manifest with credentials values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

## What gets flagged

```yaml
# FLAGGED: the password and API key entries
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: billing-api
type: Opaque
data:
  username: YmlsbGluZw==        # not a credential key, not flagged
  password: Ums5eVcyczlMcTd6
  stripe-api-key: c2stbGl2ZS1iaWxsaW5nLTQ4Mjk3MzE1OTA=
```

Not flagged:

- Helm and other templated values (`{{ .Values.db.password | b64enc }}`), `${VAR}` and `$(VAR)` references, `<placeholder>` values and empty strings.
- Default or placeholder words (`password`, `changeme`, `admin`, `xxxx...`), including their base64 encodings.
- SOPS-encrypted values (`ENC[AES256_GCM,data:...]`), release-pipeline token substitutions (`#{DbPassword}#`, `__API_TOKEN__`, `%%TOKEN%%`) and argocd-vault-plugin `<path:...>` references.
- `SealedSecret`, `ExternalSecret`, `ConfigMap` and other kinds, and `secretKeyRef` references.
- Test, fixture and testdata files.

## Remediation

1. **Revoke the leaked credential** in the provider's console immediately.
2. **Replace with a short-lived alternative**, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
3. **Store the new credential in a secrets manager** (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
4. **Audit the provider's access logs** for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
5. **Purge from git history** with `git filter-repo` or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
6. **Enable push protection** so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

## References

- [CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html)
- [gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks)
- [truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog)
- [OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credentials_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/)
- [git-filter-repo](https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo)

## Suppressing this rule

Put a `nosec` comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file's language (`#`, `//`, `--` or `;`):

```text
# nosec vnx-sec-074
// nosec vnx-sec-074
```

Or record an ignore rule: `vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-074 --reason "..."`. See [Suppressing findings](/sast/guides/suppressing-findings.md).
